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1. Introduction 
 
From the perspective of the international establishment and 
indeed most mainstream economists, and seemingly also parts of the 
Chinese state leadership, furthering the market reform of the country’s 
financial system must not be deterred or sidetracked by the financial 
crises in the advanced capitalist economies. What China must do is to 
continue to pursue the liberalization, privatization, and 
internationalization of its financial system (World Bank, 2012). In this 
light, the fact that China has (so far) avoided financial crises is seen as no 
more than an accidental outcome, one that comes at a high cost. The 
Chinese reality is seen as a fragile banking sector being protected by an 
underdeveloped system of regulations and controls. The logical 
conclusion: China must pursue further market reforms in the direction of 
fostering the profit maximization cum risk minimization pursuit of 
individual banks. 
These views appear to be flawed in relation to the international 
discussion over the reform of banking regulations and controls. They are 
mostly based on the understanding that financial fragility is caused by 
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insufficient prudence of individual banks. And, theoretically, this 
understanding is underpinned by the economics of information 
asymmetry: insufficient prudence is a symptom of market failure caused 
by the moral hazard of individual banks. But this theoretical and policy 
position has faced serious challenges in the international discussion. A 
contrasting view posits that financial fragility is a systematic 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the excessively risky pursuits of 
individual banks. This alternative view highlights the centrality of the 
different structures of the financial sector in the generation and/or the 
prevention of fragility (Levy Institute, 2012). 
Meanwhile the alternative, essentially Keynesian-Schumpeterian-
Minskyan view also challenges the mainstream, market-failure approach 
to dealing with financial fragility. The pursuit of prudence as a means of 
avoiding market failures – and thereby of achieving allocative efficiency 
in the form of profit maximization cum risk minimization – might have 
its justification, but such a pursuit cannot be the only moral for the design 
of the financial structure and the system of regulations and controls. 
Prudence could come at a cost if it contradicts the functioning of the 
banking sector for ‘capital development’, that is, credit creation for the 
promotion of productive investment. Conversely, a seemingly suboptimal 
banking sector, with insufficient prudence, might in fact have the 
advantage of promoting productive efficiency. The cost and benefit of 
having fragility, and of pursuing prudence, thus both need to be taken 
into consideration. 
The Chinese experience of finance and economic development is a 
case in point. It is suggested in a previous article published in this journal 
(Lo et al., 2011), that there has always been a trade-off between 
allocative and productive efficiency in the evolution of Chinese finance. 
The predominance of state-controlled banks and the strong influences of 
the state in general have produced both tendencies of serious short-term 
macroeconomic fluctuations and fast expansion in long-term productive 
investment. Thus, the evolution of the Chinese system of banking 
regulations and controls should be analyzed and assessed in relation to 
these peculiar institutional-structural features of the banking sector. The 
objective of this article is to carry out an empirical study in light of this. 
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The rest of the paper is organized in four sections, in addition to this 
introduction. Section two depicts the salient features of the Chinese 
system of banking regulations and controls, with a focus on its interaction 
with the actual development of the banks. Section three analyzes the 
efficacy of the system in the prevention of financial fragility. Section four 
seeks to conceptualize and deepen the understanding of the features of the 
system, by means of relating the Chinese reality to the relevant 
theoretical literature and the corresponding international discussion over 
the reform of banking regulations and controls. Section five concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. Characteristics of banking regulations and controls, Chinese style 
 
The market reforms of the Chinese financial system since the late 
1970s have been mainly a process of increasing liberalization, 
commercialization, and internationalization. Nevertheless, to date it has 
remained a mixed system with strong state influence. The sector has been 
dominated by a small number of state-controlled commercial banks, and 
the state has never been hesitant to exercise its influence over finance 
both in its short-term and long-term policy decisions (Lo et al., 2011).  
At the levels of conduct and performance, owing to the close state-
bank relationship, the state has effectively served as an implicit guarantor 
of the banks in taking deposits. And the allocation of bank resources has 
been, in a significant measure, under state directions. Consequently, in 
the context of a state orientation that emphasizes long-term economic 
development, Chinese finance on the whole has done a quite reasonable 
job in promoting productive investment and thereby the productivity 
growth of the economy. On the down side, and seen from the perspective 
of mainstream neoclassical economics, this system is prone to cause two 
serious problems. First, state influence over the allocation of bank 
resources tends to distort the market. The fact that state-owned 
enterprises and large-scale capital-intensive enterprises tend to receive a 
more than proportionate share of bank loans is symptomatic of 
misallocation, and therefore of the sacrifice of allocative efficiency. 
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Second, the close state-bank relationship tends to promote soft-budget 
behaviour on the part of the banks, resulting in insufficient prudence time 
and again. The periodic emergence of sizeable non-performing loans is 
seen as an indication of this problem (Allen et al., 2005; 2012). 
In the face of these structural-institutional features of the banking 
sector, the Chinese system of banking regulations and controls has had to 
confront two complex tasks at the same time. These, namely, are (a) to 
avoid fragility and promote the stability of the sector; and (b) to direct the 
allocation of bank resources at promoting productive investment. In other 
words, the system has had to maintain a delicate balance on two different 
levels. First, it needs to strike a balance between controlling the risk of 
individual banks and directing banks to finance the achievement of goals 
of state strategies for economic development. Second, it needs to strike a 
balance between controlling short-term fluctuations in bank credits and 
promoting credit expansion for the purpose of long-term investment. 
Because the sources of financial instability are two-fold, from the 
state and from the banks themselves, the Chinese system of regulations 
and controls has necessarily been a mix of both purely regulatory and 
administrative means. From the beginning of the reform era up until the 
late 1990s, administrative means were the main tools. Every year, the 
government implemented a credit plan, which imposed a ceiling on the 
loan volumes of individual banks and therefore on the sum total of bank 
credit in that year. The practice of the credit plan officially came to an 
end in 1998, because, along with the process of commercialization of the 
state banks, there was an increased possibility of the government 
gradually shifting to rely upon regulatory means to control bank 
behaviour. The establishment of an independent (from the central bank) 
regulator, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), in 2003 
was a watershed in this shift. Nevertheless, the government has continued 
to retain the power to exercise administrative controls if needed. It has 
several times injected capital into ‘systemically important’ banks. And it 
has retained the power to appoint the top executives of the state-
controlled banks. Conversely, whilst the banks have been given the 
autonomy to decide on their loan volumes in normal times, the 
government has come out to give directives for expanding or cutting back 
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on bank lending in times of crisis – such as in the turbulent years of 
2008-2011. 
Since its establishment, the CBRC has striven to safeguard micro 
prudence including the application of the Basel Accords on the banks. 
The measures taken have the standard focus on strengthening capital 
adequacy, liquidity management, control over credit risk, and corporate 
governance. In practice, because the state-controlled banks are 
structurally ‘too big to fail’ and institutionally inclined to soft-budget 
behaviour, the CBRC has had to be more stringent than is required by the 
Basel Accords. Together with the normal stipulation on the provision-
coverage ratio, for instance, the CBRC has used the provision-loan ratio 
(i.e. the ratio of total provision to total loans) as a regulatory tool. It 
typically requires setting the provision-loan ratio at 2.5% or above, the 
provision-coverage ratio at 150% or above, and the loan-deposit ratio at 
75% or below. The loan-deposit ratio, in particular, is used to control 
both the liquidity risk and the pace of credit expansion of commercial 
banks. For controlling credit risk, the CBRC has set a capital adequacy 
ratio of no less than 11.5% for ‘systemically important’ banks and of no 
less than 10.5% for the other banks, which officially are said to be both 
higher than the levels of those comparable requirements in the Basel 
Accords. In addition, the CBRC requires commercial banks to separate 
out the functional division that approves loans from the division that 
actually provides the loans, and to assure that loans are provided for 
approved usages. The continuous shrinkage of the size of non-performing 
loans with commercial banks since the establishment of the CRBC, 
shown in table 1, seems to testify to the success of these measures. 
Over and above the concern for micro prudence, from the early years 
of the reform era the Chinese authorities overseeing financial matters 
have recognized the importance of avoiding the accumulation and spread 
of systemic risk. The principle of separating out the banking sector from 
the capital market has always been upheld. Whilst acknowledging that 
this separation could hamper the pursuit of profit by the banks (and hence 
the achievement of allocative efficiency), it is nevertheless the belief of 
the authorities that avoiding systemic risk is a more important 
consideration. In  practice,  the  CBRC has enforced the principle of ‘lend 
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Table 1 –Non-performing loans of China’s commercial banks (100m 
yuan, %) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NPLs 21044 17175 12196 11703 12010 4865 4265 12437 10533 
   Substandard 3201 3075 2950 2271 1844 2249 1691 5853 4784 
   Doubtful 11131 8899 4609 4850 4358 2122 2016 4968 4401 
   Loss 6713 5202 4638 4582 5808 495 558 1617 1348 
Rate of NPLs  17.9 13.2 8.9 7.5 6.7 2.4 1.6 2.4 1.8  
   Substandard 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.5 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.8 
   Doubtful 9.4 6.8 3.4 3.1 2.4 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.7 
   Loss 5.7 4.0 3.4 2.9 3.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Sources: China Banking Regulatory Commission (2006-2011), Annual Report. 
 
 
as you pay’ in commercial lending, i.e. loans will only be disbursed to the 
recipients that are trading partners of the borrowers – not to the borrowers 
themselves – in line with the specified usages of the loan agreements. 
This is meant to prevent bank loans from flowing into the stock market. 
For the same reason, commercial banks are not allowed to engage in 
securities trading and underwriting, investment in non-bank financial 
institutions and productive enterprises, and trust investment. As a result 
of these measures, bank performance has been basically unrelated to the 
stock market. The change in the scale of non-performing loans has been 
quite different from the movement in stock market capitalization (figure 
1). 
The stringent system of banking regulations and controls, and the 
separation of commercial and investment banking, have seemed to serve 
China well in terms of avoiding an American-type financial crisis. But 
this has come at a cost. In addition to hampering the pursuit of profit by 
the banks, the  system  also tends to  push up  the  cost of  financing  for  
Figure 1 – Stock market fluctuations and bank non-performing loans 
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Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; CBRC Annual Report, various issues. 
 
 
industrial firms, particularly those firms that are not state owned or not 
listed in the stock market. This gives rise to the perception of Chinese 
finance as a sector of inefficient, fragile state-controlled banks protected by 
an underdeveloped system of regulations and controls. Mainstream 
neoclassical economists, notably Allen et al. (2012), in line with the standard 
theory of financial liberalization (La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 2002; Barth 
et al., 2004), have been outspoken in demanding further, more ‘complete’ 
market reforms to get out of this perceived predicament. Specifically, given 
the indicated cost associated with the current system, there would seem to be 
scope for arbitrage activities and for the expansion of unregulated informal 
finance. Mainstream economists have often contended that informal finance 
has been instrumental to the development of the (allegedly) more efficient 
but less privileged nonstate-owned firms. And this development is claimed to 
be instrumental to the improvement in the allocative efficiency of the 
economy (Allen et al., 2005; 2008). 
Whether or not this claim is valid, the expansion of informal finance 
necessarily entails an erosion of the existing system of banking regulations 
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and controls. Already there is evidence that financial and macroeconomic 
stability has had to pay a price for it. The bubbles in property values and the 
volatility in commodity prices since 2006, and particularly the 2007-2008 
stock market boom and bust, indicate the role of informal finance in 
amplifying instability (Allen et al., 2012). The cases of the collapse of 
informal finance in 2011-2012 (especially in the Wenzhou region of 
Zhejiang province) following the government’s monetary tightening are clear 
evidence of the same problem. In reality, the separation between formal and 
informal finance has been far from complete. There is evidence suggesting 
that informal finance has become a significant competitor of formal 
commercial banks for deposits, and a significant source of funds for informal 
finance has been from the formal sector. And the collapse of informal 
finance in 2011-2012 had the effect of pushing up the level of non-
performing loans owed to the formal commercial banks.1 
Strengthening regulations and controls over shadow finance has 
appeared to be a trend worldwide in recent years. But, because the 
development of informal finance is a new phenomenon there, such 
strengthening has yet to take place in China. What the CBRC has been 
doing is to try as far as possible to separate out formal and informal 
finance, but this practice might not be very effective. Because of 
information asymmetry, it is difficult for the banks to verify the 
informal financial activities of businesses. As the same firm can be 
involved in both formal and informal financial activities, failures in the 
latter area can spread to the former. Furthermore, because of the 
information advantage of informal financial institutions over the banks, 
there could also be an asymmetry (to the disadvantage of the banks) in 
shouldering the burdens of failures. Again, this has been especially 
                                                            
1 One estimate in early 2013 by the official China Finance Research Institute puts the total 
assets of shadow banking in China at a scale of 17-19 trillion yuan (compared with the 
approximately 127 trillion yuan of the total assets of the formal banking sector), including 
3.4 trillion yuan with ‘underground banks’ (http://kan.weibo.com/con/3535268863152255? 
_from=title). In the case of Wenzhou in 2011, some studies indicate that the crisis in the 
informal finance sector threatened to significantly increase the non-performing loans of 
the formal commercial banks (http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120327/0134 
11683142.shtml). 
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evident in Wenzhou, the region that is famous worldwide for its 
burgeoning private economy. 
 
 
3. Analyzing the efficacy of the Chinese approach 
 
Given the structural-institutional characteristics of Chinese finance 
depicted in the preceding section, it is to be expected that all kinds of 
financial fragility will ultimately show up in the form of an accumulation 
of non-performing loans held by banks. Fragility might be caused by 
excessive credit expansion, either due to the soft-budget behaviour of the 
banks or due to state initiatives for practising counter-cyclical policies or 
for promoting long-term investment. Fragility could also arise from the 
illicit flow of funds from the banks to the informal finance sector. In all 
cases, the quality of bank assets will indicate the healthiness, or otherwise, 
of all these initiatives and activities. That is why the system of 
regulations and controls has been designed to focus on safeguarding the 
quality of bank assets. 
In this section, we seek to analyze the efficacy of the Chinese system 
of banking regulations and controls in terms of controlling the 
accumulation of non-performing loans. For this purpose, we use the data 
supplied by the BANKSCOPE database. This contains the relevant data 
of 46 Chinese banks of all ownership types and different sizes – including 
the ‘Big Four’ state-controlled banks and 12 shareholding banks – for the 
years 2004-2011. There are in total 300 observations. Our regression 
model takes the following form: 
 
ܰܲܮ௧ ൌ ߚଵܴܱܧ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ቀே௘௧ூ௡௖௢௠௘ோ௜௦௞	஺௦௦௘௧௦ቁ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܵ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܮ݋ܽ݊ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௧ିଵ ൅
൅	ߚହܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚ଺ܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ ∗ ܵݐܽݐ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧        (1) 
where REO (returns per share) indicates the constraint imposed by 
shareholders on the bank; Size (the natural logarithm of bank assets) 
indicates the ability of banks to withstand risk; LoanGrowth (the growth 
of bank loans) indicates the general economic conditions for lending; 
Regulation refers to the four standard regulatory tools of provision 
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coverage ratio (RIGL = reserves for impaired loans / gross loans), the 
ratio of reserves for impaired loans to total impaired loans (RILL), capital 
adequacy ratio (TCR = total regulatory capital ratio), and core-capital 
adequacy ratio (Tier-1 = tier-one regulatory capital ratio). In addition, the 
cross term Regulation*State (where State is a dummy variable for state 
ownership) is meant to reflect the difference between state and non-state 
banks in their capacity to withstand risk, in consideration of the greater 
scope for state banks to pass on risk to the government. 
The regression results are presented in table 2. It can be seen that the 
variables REO (or the similar indicator of the ratio of net incomes to risk 
assets), Size and LoanGrowth are all negatively correlated with non-
performing loans. This is reasonable, given that the variables in question 
reflect the financial performance of the banks as well as the broader 
economic conditions. The years 2002-2008 were a boom period, with 
very fast expansion in investment and economic growth. Bank 
profitability benefited from the economic boom, and their balance sheets 
largely improved as a result. 
Turning to the effects of regulations, the regression results are rather 
erratic. It can be seen that, for state banks, only RIGL (ratio of reserves 
for impaired loans to gross loans) has the expected effect of reducing 
non-performing loans, whereas all the other variables have not. For non-
state banks, the effects of applying the regulatory tools are mixed: the 
coefficient of RIGL becomes statistically significantly positive, that of 
RILL (ratio of reserves for impaired loans to total impaired loans) 
becomes significantly negative, that of TCR (total regulatory capital ratio) 
is significantly positive, while that of Tier-1 (tier-one regulatory capital 
ratio) remains insignificant. On the whole, for both state and non-state 
banks, these standard regulatory tools aimed at safeguarding micro 
prudence do not appear to have done their job in terms of controlling the 
accumulation of non-performing loans. 
But, in reality, the scale of non-performing loans did register rapid 
decreases during this period, as indicated in table 1 and figure 1 above. 
The good economic conditions at the time may explain some of the 
decreases, whereas the micro-focused regulations do not seem to have 
played a significant role. How about the administrative means of banking 
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regulations and controls, the other part of the Chinese system? Besides 
measures such as enforcing the separation of banking from the securities 
market, and shaping the structure of the corporate governance of banks, 
administrative means also take the form of direct government orders and 
appointing the top executives of the banks. Unfortunately, unlike the 
standard regulatory tools, these administrative means are difficult to 
quantify or to even observe. What we can do is verify their efficacy 
through the indirect method of analyzing the time effects of applying the 
regulatory tools. 
As a matter of fact, for various reasons associated with the gradual 
commercialization and capitalization of state-controlled banks, the 
reliance on regulatory tools became fully functional only after 2007 (Lo 
et al., 2007). Against this backdrop, it will be useful to find out whether 
the efficacy of the regulatory tools has significantly improved after 2007.  
We  use  a  time-dummy  Year, and set Year = 0  before 2007 and Year = 
1 after 2007. The cross terms, of Year multiplied by the variables of 
regulatory tools, appear to capture the effects of applying these regulatory 
tools. The regression results are provided in table 3. It can be seen that, 
by introducing the time-dummy, the effects of the application of the 
provision coverage ratio (RIGL) and capital adequacy ratio (TCR) both 
largely increase: the coefficients of the variables both turn from 
insignificant to significantly negative. The market reforms, and the 
strengthening self-discipline of commercial banks along the way, have 
gradually increased the scope of application of the regulatory tools. 
Conversely, it can be inferred that non-regulatory tools, i.e. 
administrative controls, have also significantly contributed to controlling 
the accumulation of non-performing loans, particularly before 2007. 
The analyses above appear to suggest that, hitherto, the mix of 
regulatory tools and administrative controls has been basically effective 
in safeguarding financial stability in China. Market reforms have led to a 
gradual shift to increasing the importance of regulatory tools, but 
administrative controls have remained a significant part of the safeguard 
arrangements. 
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Table 2 – Controlling for non-performing loans in state banks and non-
state banks 
 
Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  NPLt  NPLt  NPLt  NPLt 
ROEt-1 -0.008 0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
NetIncome/RiskAsset -0.211 -0.337*** -0.438** -0.344** 
 (0.190) (0.117) (0.159) (0.148) 
LoanGrowtht-1 -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Sizet-1 -1.613*** -0.849* -1.327*** -1.352*** 
 (0.159) (0.478) (0.272) (0.271) 
RIGLt-1 -0.728***    
 (0.155)    
RIGL*Statet-1 1.101***    
 (0.193)    
RILLt-1  -0.172   
  (0.253)   
RILL*Statet-1  -0.459**   
  (0.207)   
TCRt-1   0.017  
   (0.043)  
TCR*Statet-1   0.112**  
   (0.044)  
Tier1t-1    -0.004 
    (0.049) 
Tier1*Statet-1    0.159 
    (0.097) 
β5 +β6 =0 0.004 0.012 0.021 0.129 
R2 0.876 0.859 0.827 0.826 
Number of banks 20 20 20 20 
Note: RIGL = reserves for impaired loans / gross loans; TCR= total regulatory capital ratio; Tier1= 
tier-1 regulatory capital ratio; RILL = reserves for impaired loans / impaired loans. State is a dummy 
variable, where State = 1 if the bank is state controlled, or else State = 0. All regressions were 
estimated using a fixed effects model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. β5 + β6 = 0 
is a Chi-square test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of Regulation and the cross 
item Regulation*State is zero. The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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4. China through the lens of the international discussion over reforms 
 
Mainstream economists have often depicted Chinese finance as an 
inefficient, fragile banking sector protected by an underdeveloped system 
of regulations and controls. This perception is underpinned by the 
relevant theories of neoclassical economics. 
The basic function of banking, in neoclassical economics, is to efficiently 
manage the transformation of liquid deposits (bank liabilities) into illiquid 
loans (bank assets). This way, the time-preference of depositors and the need 
for finance of business will both be satisfied (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), and 
the efficient allocation of financial resources will be achieved (Levine, 2002).  
In respect to this, what are the reasons for the existence of a system of banking 
regulations and controls? The theory of asymmetric information posits that the 
single  most important  reason  is to  avoid  market  failures  caused by possible 
moral-hazard behaviour of the banks. Safeguarding prudence is thus at the 
heart of regulation and control. Prudence entails providing protection for 
depositors, ensuring that banks are not fragile, and avoiding the spread of 
failures among banks. Once prudence is ensured, the banks can then be left to 
work in a way that is as close as possible to the unfettered capital market, so 
that allocative efficiency can be achieved. 
Seen in this light, Chinese finance has a long way to come before 
becoming truly efficient. To date, Chinese banks – state-controlled banks 
in particular – have displayed marked insufficient prudence, evident in 
the periodic eruption of soft-budget behaviour. And the system of 
regulations and controls has time and again had to sacrifice allocative 
efficiency for the sake of avoiding systemic collapse, evident in the 
continuous reliance on administrative means to get the banks under 
control. But, is micro prudence necessarily the paramount criterion for 
assessing Chinese finance? 
The view is broadened once we take note of alternative theories of 
efficiency, and of financial instability, provided by the Keynesian-
Schumpeterian-Minskyan tradition of economics. From the perspective of 
this tradition, allocative efficiency is not necessarily more important than 
productive efficiency in economic development, and financial instability 
is systemic and endemic to the market economy. 
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Table 3 – The time effects of regulations focusing on micro prudence 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3)      (4) 
 NPLt NPLt NPLt      NPLt 
ROEt-1 -0.0165** -0.002 -0.0126** -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
NetIncome/RiskAsset -0.033 -0.362*** -0.134 -0.344** 
 (0.147) (0.122) (0.131) (0.148) 
LoanGrowtht-1 -0.005 -0.017*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Sizet-1 -0.690** -0.458 -0.848*** -1.352*** 
 (0.295) (0.572) (0.226) (0.271) 
RIGLt-1 0.283    
 (0.274)    
RIGL t-1*Year -0.266***    
 (0.067)    
RILLt-1  -0.114   
  (0.349)   
RILL t-1*Year  -0.256   
  (0.235)   
TCRt-1   0.048  
   (0.033)  
TCR t-1*Year   -0.0450***  
   (0.012)  
Tier1t-1    -0.004 
    (0.049) 
Tier1 t-1*Year    0.159 
    (0.097) 
Number of banks 20 20 20 20 
R2 0.897 0.842 0.868 0.826 
 
Note: RIGL = reserves for impaired loans / gross loans; TCR = total regulatory capital ratio; Tier1= 
tier-1 regulatory capital ratio; RILL = reserves for impaired loans / impaired loans. Year is a dummy 
variable, where Year = 1 after 2007 or else Year = 0. All regressions were estimated using a fixed 
effects model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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The increasing fragility of finance in different stages – hedge, 
speculative, and Ponzi – is seen as endemic to the interaction between 
credit expansion, productive investment, and business profitability 
(Minsky, 1993). And the reason for the existence of banking regulations 
and controls is to avoid systemic fragility, by means of safeguarding the 
appropriate financial structures. Specifically, Kregel (2010) contends that 
at the heart of the current crises are the dominant financial structures 
nowadays in the world – namely, the inseparability of the credit market 
and the securities market. The fusion of the two markets encourages 
banks to reduce risks and expand credits, thus helping to create asset 
bubbles and, ultimately, pushing the financial system into a Ponzi state. 
To effectively cope with the crises would thus require the restructuring of 
the financial system as a whole. 
The structure of Chinese finance has centred on a close state-bank 
relationship, and the forceful separation of banking from the securities 
markets. The relationship is prone to boost credit expansion, both because 
of the soft-budget behaviour of the banks and the policy objectives of the 
state. As a result, it requires the indicated separation to guide the flow of 
bank resources mainly to productive investment, rather than to 
speculative activities. It also requires the exercise of administrative 
controls, at times when curbing excessive credit expansion becomes 
necessary. All these are a far cry from the principle of micro prudence 
and the logic of allocative efficiency. Nevertheless, on balance, Chinese 
finance appears to have hitherto done a reasonable job both in terms of 
promoting productive investment and curbing financial instability. Is 
there room for substantial improvement? Is it still necessary to pursue 
rapid and fundamental market reforms? 
After 2007, since the outbreak of financial crises in the advanced 
economies, the international discussion on the reform of banking 
regulations and controls has exhibited some important developments. It 
has, to some extent, recognized the limitations of the micro-prudential 
approach. The notion of systemic risks, in addition to individual risks, has 
been widely accepted. Many mainstream economists seemed to agree that, 
in addition to individual fragility, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
fragility of financial institutions, products, or markets that are of 
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‘systemic importance’. It is also necessary to pay attention to the notion 
of macro prudence in the face of systemic shocks, where exclusively 
focusing on micro prudence may turn out to be counter-productive – as 
the banks might all come out to cut back on assets, rather than raising 
new capital, in order to satisfy the requirements of micro prudence 
(Hanson et al., 2011; Kashyap et al., 2010). 
But this revision of opinion in the mainstream establishments appears 
to be insufficient for guiding further reform of Chinese finance. For one 
thing, the newly developed views tend to see systemic risk, or systemic 
shocks, as exogenously determined. This overlooks the Minskyan insight 
that fragility ultimately comes from particular structures of finance. The 
efficacy of the macro-prudential approach in avoiding financial crisis thus 
remains in question. Meanwhile, the newly developed views also tend to 
hold a market-failure understanding of the nature of financial fragility. The 
criterion for assessing the efficacy of regulations and controls is the 
achievement of allocative efficiency. This overlooks the necessary function 
of finance in promoting productive efficiency. In order to better inform 
real-world practices, further developments in the international discussion 
need to take better account of the insights offered by the Keynesian-
Schumpeterian-Minskyan tradition. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
How should China proceed with respect to reforming its system of 
banking regulations and controls? Different answers can arise from 
different theoretical perspectives, and ultimately from different 
assessments of reality – in terms of the system’s efficiency attributes and 
its ability to maintain financial and macroeconomic stability. 
The neoclassical approach focuses its attention on the prudence of 
individual banks. In its objective of achieving allocative efficiency, it 
seeks to prevent market failures caused by the operations of the banks. In 
this light, it is contended that China should further its market reforms in 
the direction of fostering the profit maximization cum risk minimization 
pursuit of individual banks. Meanwhile, the Keynesian-Schumpeterian-
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Minskyan approach focuses its attention on coping with systemic fragility. 
And systemic fragility is seen as endemic to the interaction between 
credit expansion and contraction, productive investment, and business 
profitability. In this light, even if it is indeed allocatively inefficient, 
Chinese finance can still have its advantages in terms of promoting 
productive efficiency. Fundamentally strengthening market reforms may 
or may not be desirable for China, depending on the trade-off between the 
two types of efficiency. Insofar as the strengthening of regulations and 
controls is necessary for the purpose of avoiding instability, they should 
be targeted at the structure of the financial sector as a whole rather than 
exclusively focusing on the prudence of individual banks. 
In this paper, we find that the neoclassical approach does have 
applicable elements that reveal the allocative inefficiency and inherent 
instability of Chinese finance. Nevertheless, because of its narrow focus, 
the policy conclusion drawn from the neoclassical approach is partial and 
can be misleading. We argue that, in view of its efficiency attributes and 
effectiveness in curbing instability, Chinese finance should not be subject 
to the uni-directional pursuit of market reform. A more appropriate policy 
conclusion is that further reforms should be informed by a clear 
understanding of both the advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese 
system of banking regulations and controls. 
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